Eventos

Próximos Eventos

Conferência Internacional de Banking e Desenvolvimento Econômico
December 6, 2018 - 2:00pm a December 7, 2018 - 6:00pm
Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e Empresas (EBAPE)

O Center for Banking and Finance in Rio junto com a Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas (EBAPE) da Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) convida a todos para a Conferência Internacional de Banking and Desenvolvimento Econômico que será realizada no Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, no dia 6 e 7 de Dezembro.

Programação da Conferência

Inscrição

Conferência Parceira no Chile(diretamente após a Conferência Internacional de Banking e Desenvolvimento Econômico no Rio)
December 10, 2018 - 9:00am a December 11, 2018 - 6:00pm

Santiago Finance Workshop, organizado pela Universidade do Chile, Dezembro 10-11, 2018.

Deadline para submissão dos papers: June 30, 2018.

Link: http://www.santiagofinanceworkshop.com/

Eventos Realizados

Seminário de Pesquisa em Finanças: Co-Pierre Georg
August 31, 2018 -
2:00pm a 4:00pm
FGV/EBAPE - Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30 / Room 3

Seminário de Finanças, Co-Pierre Georg, University of Cape Town, Africa do Sul.

Título: How Financial Institutions Manage Political Risk: Evidence from Brexit and the Trump Election

Recent years have seen a significant increase in political uncertainty around the world. This paper exploits trade-level data to study how financial institutions manage such political risk, in particular how they reacted to the Brexit vote and the Trump election. We provide evidence that in the weeks before the votes, financial institutions were more likely to increase their exposure to UK and US when the polls suggested that Brexit and Trump’s victory were less likely. Financial institutions also significantly sell their holdings of UK and US securities, respectively, in the immediate aftermath of these votes. Furthermore, these effects are more pronounced for institutions with a higher exposure to the UK (and US), and for more fragile banks, such as those exhibiting low equity ratio or high loss provision. In addition, we also show that these results are mainly driven by the institutions' proprietary trading rather than by the institutions’ customers trading strategies.

Advanced Corporate Finance
July 11, 2018 - 9:00am a July 25, 2018 - 5:00pm
FGV/EBAPE - Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30

CBFR informa que o Professor Murillo Campello (Johnson Business School/ Cornell University) irá ministrar o curso “Advanced Corporate Finance” no periodo de 11 a 24 de Julho na EBAPE.

 

 

Seminário de Pesquisa em Finanças: Pedro Matos
June 6, 2018 -
10:00am a 12:00pm
FGV/EBAPE - Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30 / Sala 3

Seminário de Finanças, Pedro Matos, University of Virginia, EUA.
Título: Leviathan Inc. and Corporate Environmental Engagement

In a 2010 report, The Economist called the resurgence of state-owned mega-enterprises, especially those in emerging economies, “Leviathan Inc.”, and criticized their poor governance and efficiency. We show that state-owned enterprises engage more in environmental issues and are more responsive to salient environmental events and change in government’s political orientation. The effect is more pronounced in energy firms from emerging economies and countries with higher energy risks, and with direct shareholdings by domestic government rather than sovereign wealth funds. Firm performance does not suffer from such engagement suggesting that “Leviathan Inc.” may be better positioned at dealing with environmental externalities.

Workshop de Estabilidade Financeira
May 7, 2018 - 9:00am a May 14, 2018 - 12:00pm

 

O professor Dr. Wolf Wagner, pesquisador do CBFR, irá ministrar o Workshop de Estabilidade Financeira na FGV-EBAPE nos dias 7 a 14 de Maio de 2018. O workshop faz parte da Linha de Finanças no programa de Mestrado e Doutorado da EBAPE.

Seminário de Pesquisa em Finanças: Klenio Barbosa
February 7, 2018 -
10:00am a 12:00pm
FGV/EBAPE - Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30 / Sala 3

Seminário de Finanças, KLENIO BARBOSA, INSPER, Brasil.

Título: BANK COMPETITION AND THE LIMITS OF CREDITOR'S PROTECTION REFORMS

This paper empirically investigates how the lack of competition in the credit market can hamper the effects of an increase in creditor protection on the interest rate and the spread of loans in the Brazilian credit market. Banking oligopoly pricing theory suggests that the effects of an increase in creditor protections may be limited or absent on interest rates in credit markets which lack competition. Brazil is a perfect testing ground to study the effect of an increase in the creditor protection because in early 2005 a new bankruptcy law was approved by the Brazilian Congress. That new legislation improved corporate creditor protection and the bankruptcy system’s efficiency. Using monthly data provided by the Central Bank of Brazil, which contains information on bank interest rates for corporate and consumer loans, volume of credit, market power indicators, and other important covariates, we find that the lack of competition hampers 27.5% of the potential reducing effect of the law in the interest rate of new corporate credit operations. If we consider the average market power over all credit lines (treated and control group), then the liming effect represents 295 basis points, or 40.1%. Our results show that an institutional reform in that increases creditors protection has a positive effect on credit condition for firms, but the competition structure of the market matters.

Seminário de Pesquisa em Finanças: Ruy Monteiro Ribeiro
November 22, 2017 -
10:00am a 12:00pm
FGV/EBAPE - Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30 / Room 3

Seminário de Finanças, RUY MONTEIRO RIBEIRO, PUC-Rio, Brazil.

Title: Term Structure(s) of Equity Risk Premium

Using dividend and variance swap data simultaneously, we provide a series of novel facts on the term structure of equity risk premium. We also show the importance of another dimension of the term structure related to investment horizon and how the term structure changes over time. Moreover, we uncover new information on the level and variation of the term structure of the (physical) expectation of dividend growth. Among many facts, we show that: risk premium in increasing and concave on maturity; risk premium is also increasing and concave on investment horizon, but increases much faster than maturity; independently of maturity, most of the risk premium is associated with short-horizon risk premium; dividends are highly predictable once we account for time variation in the horizon term structure; and liquidity explains the high returns of dividend contracts and the term structure puzzle. Using both dimensions jointly highlights additional challenges to asset pricing models, but, unlike previous literature, we show that all these facts are consistent, for instance, with a long-run risk model with jump risks. 

Seminário de Pesquisa em Finanças: Michael Weber
April 3, 2017 -
10:00am a 12:00pm
FGV/EBAPE - Praia de Botafogo, 190 / Sala 537

Seminário de Finanças, Michael Weber, University of Chicago, EUA.

Title: The Long Shadow of Jewish Persecution on Financial Decisions

For centuries, Jews have been associated with financial services. We find that present-day households in German counties where Jewish persecution was higher in the Middle Ages and the Nazi period invest less in stocks, have lower savings in bank deposits, and are less likely to get a mortgage, but not to own a house. Current antisemitism, generalized trust, or supply-side forces do not appear to explain these correlations, which are consistent with a norm of distrust in finance, transmitted across generations. The forced migrations of the Ashkenazi communities across the German lands after the 11th century help assess the extent to which the effect of Jewish persecution on present-day financial decisions is causal.

Conferência parceira no Chile após a Conferência Internacional Sobre Finanças de Pequenas Empresas
December 12, 2016 - 12:00am

Santiago Finance Workshop, Dezembro 12-13, 2016

Chamada de Trabalhos (link)

International Conference on Small Business Finance in Rio 2016
December 8, 2016 - 12:30pm a December 9, 2016 - 6:30pm
FGV, Praia de Botafogo 190, 22250-900 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil, Auditório Manoel Thompson Motta, 12th Floor

1. Chamada de Artigos

Link

 

2. Programação Final

Link

 

3. Artigos para Download

When Does Relationship Lending Start To Pay? - López-Espinosa, Mayordomo and Moreno.

The Size and Ownership of Private Credit Bureaus - Karapetyan and Stacescu.

Outsourcing Bank Loan Screening: The Economics of Third-Party Loan Guarantees - Dybvig, Shan and Tang.

Credit constraints and guarantees for small firms - Mullins and Toro.

The effects of business group affiliation: Evidence from firms being “left alone" - Larrain, Sertsios and Urzua.

Some borrowers are more equal than others: Bank funding shocks and credit reallocation - Jonghe, Dewachter, Mulier, Ongena and Schepens.

Substitution Effects in Private Debt: Evidence from SMEs - Illueca, Norden and van Kampen

The Role of Labor Mobility in Credit Market Development - Wang.

 

4. Fotos

Seminário de Finanças: Allen N. Berger
December 7, 2016 -
10:00am a 12:00pm
FGV Ebape

Seminário de Finanças, Allen N. Berger, University of South Carolina, EUA.

 

Do Bank Bailouts Reduce or Increase Systemic Risk? The Effects of TARP on Financial System Stability

 

Theory suggests that bank bailouts may either reduce or increase systemic risk. This paper is the first to address this issue empirically, analyzing the U.S. Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Difference-in-difference analysis suggests that TARP significantly reduced contributions to systemic risk, particularly for larger and safer banks located in better local economies. This occurred primarily through a capital cushion channel. Results are robust to additional tests, including accounting for potential endogeneity and selection bias. Findings yield policy conclusions about the wisdom of bailouts, which banks might be the best targets for future bailouts, and the form these bailouts might take.

 

Clique aqui para Download.