Events

Finance Seminar, Pedro Matos, University of Virginia, EUA.
Title: Leviathan Inc. and Corporate Environmental Engagement

In a 2010 report, The Economist called the resurgence of state-owned mega-enterprises, especially those in emerging economies, “Leviathan Inc.”, and criticized their poor governance and efficiency. We show that state-owned enterprises engage more in environmental issues and are more responsive to salient environmental events and change in government’s political orientation. The effect is more pronounced in energy firms from emerging economies and countries with higher energy risks, and with direct shareholdings by domestic government rather than sovereign wealth funds. Firm performance does not suffer from such engagement suggesting that “Leviathan Inc.” may be better positioned at dealing with environmental externalities.

Finance Seminars, KLENIO BARBOSA, INSPER, Brazil.

Title: BANK COMPETITION AND THE LIMITS OF CREDITOR'S PROTECTION REFORMS

This paper empirically investigates how the lack of competition in the credit market can hamper the effects of an increase in creditor protection on the interest rate and the spread of loans in the Brazilian credit market. Banking oligopoly pricing theory suggests that the effects of an increase in creditor protections may be limited or absent on interest rates in credit markets which lack competition. Brazil is a perfect testing ground to study the effect of an increase in the creditor protection because in early 2005 a new bankruptcy law was approved by the Brazilian Congress. That new legislation improved corporate creditor protection and the bankruptcy system’s efficiency. Using monthly data provided by the Central Bank of Brazil, which contains information on bank interest rates for corporate and consumer loans, volume of credit, market power indicators, and other important covariates, we find that the lack of competition hampers 27.5% of the potential reducing effect of the law in the interest rate of new corporate credit operations. If we consider the average market power over all credit lines (treated and control group), then the liming effect represents 295 basis points, or 40.1%. Our results show that an institutional reform in that increases creditors protection has a positive effect on credit condition for firms, but the competition structure of the market matters.

Finance Seminars, Michael Weber, University of Chicago, EUA.

Title: The Long Shadow of Jewish Persecution on Financial Decisions

For centuries, Jews have been associated with financial services. We find that present-day households in German counties where Jewish persecution was higher in the Middle Ages and the Nazi period invest less in stocks, have lower savings in bank deposits, and are less likely to get a mortgage, but not to own a house. Current antisemitism, generalized trust, or supply-side forces do not appear to explain these correlations, which are consistent with a norm of distrust in finance, transmitted across generations. The forced migrations of the Ashkenazi communities across the German lands after the 11th century help assess the extent to which the effect of Jewish persecution on present-day financial decisions is causal.

1. Call for Papers

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2. Final Program

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3. Papers for Download

When Does Relationship Lending Start To Pay? - López-Espinosa, Mayordomo and Moreno.

The Size and Ownership of Private Credit Bureaus - Karapetyan and Stacescu.

Outsourcing Bank Loan Screening: The Economics of Third-Party Loan Guarantees - Dybvig, Shan and Tang.

Credit constraints and guarantees for small firms - Mullins and Toro.

The effects of business group affiliation: Evidence from firms being “left alone" - Larrain, Sertsios and Urzua.

Some borrowers are more equal than others: Bank funding shocks and credit reallocation - Jonghe, Dewachter, Mulier, Ongena and Schepens.

Substitution Effects in Private Debt: Evidence from SMEs - Illueca, Norden and van Kampen

The Role of Labor Mobility in Credit Market Development - Wang.

4. Photos