Events

Past Events

Finance Research Seminar: Janis Skrastins
11/11/2020 -
10:00 to 12:00

Finance Seminars, Janis Skrastins  - Washignton University
Title: We investigate the impact of institutions on the transmission of shocks across firms. Using novel inter-firm wire transfer data, we find that suppliers exposed to natural disasters pass this shock to their customers, particularly when the court system is congested. Evidence suggests that congested courts amplify spillovers through contracting frictions of customers with new suppliers and creditors. Subsequently, customers seem to vertically integrate the production of affected inputs and obtain liquidity by selling their accounts receivables. Our results highlight the importance of institutions.

 

Due to the covid19, the presentation will be remotely through zoom.
Linkhttps://ide-fgv-br.zoom.us/j/93254710952?pwd=Ulo2V1V5SWp3Mzh1S1RadjZsVnltZz09

ID: 932 5471 0952
Password: 1111-Janis

Finance Research Seminar: Dietmar Leisen
10/14/2020 -
10:00 to 12:00

Finance Seminars, Dietmar Leisen - Gutenberg University in Mainz
Title: When the remedy is the problem: Risk governance in independent bank boards
We study the independence ratio, as well as the financial expertise of independent directors for 625 U.S. bank holding companies (BHC) from 2000 to 2015, to concentrate on causes of the subprime crisis: short-termism, poor monitoring, and excessive risk-taking. Following Enron and Sabanes-Oxley, independence ratios rised; while official responses to the subprime crisis claim that (even then) bank directors were not independent enough, we find that higher independence ratios decrease the monitoring quality of the board and increase short-term incentives for the CEO. Finally, boards with a higher fraction of independent directors decrease standard measures of bank risk, but promote tail risk taking.

 

Due to the covid19, the presentation will be remotely through zoom.
Linkhttps://ide-fgv-br.zoom.us/j/98504105929?pwd=VkdaaG1oazZSdFd1WHhXRGt0M20rdz09

ID: 985 0410 5929
Password: Dietmar14

Finance Research Seminar: David Schoenherr
08/26/2020 -
10:00 to 12:00

Finance Seminars, David Schoenherr - Princeton University
Title: Spatial Mobility and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Credit Lotteries
In this paper, we examine the effect of access to individual mobility on labor market outcomes. We exploit exogenous time-series variation in access to individual mobility through credit lotteries that randomly allocate credit designated for motorcycle purchase to participants of a financial product in Brazil. We find that upon access to a motorcycle, individuals exhibit higher formal employment rates and earnings. Consistent with a geographically broader job search, individuals move to jobs further away from home and harder to reach by public transportation. Investment in individual mobility yields an annual rate of return of 17 percent over an individual's career.

 

 

Due to the covid19, the presentation will be remotely through zoom.
Linkhttps://ide-fgv-br.zoom.us/j/97286024576?pwd=Z3NvdTRPcmwwRmxwVTNvS0gyUFE4dz

ID: 972 8602 4576
Password: 26-8-David

Finance Research Seminar: Marco Bonomo
06/17/2020 -
10:00 to 12:00

Finance Seminars, Marco Bonomo - Insper
Title: Effects of sharing positive credit information on the credit market

Finance Research Seminar: Weichao Wang
05/27/2020 -
10:00 to 12:00

Finance Seminars, Weichao Wang - PhD Student at FGV EBAPE
Title: BANKS’ BALANCE SHEET MANAGEMENT AS A BARGAINING TOOL: EVIDENCE FROM UNION STRIKES
I investigate whether banks adjust balance sheet variables strategically in the wake of anticipated bank employee union strikes using a difference-in-difference design. Using hand-collected strike information and bank-municipality level bank balance sheet data in Brazil, I find a robust causal relationship between union strikes and bank manipulations in accrual account, asset portfolio and liquidity position within a short time period just before the routinely happened strikes from 2006 to 2016. Specifically, I find that banks significantly increased their loan loss provision ratio, decreased security and instrument trading and loans, and held less cash and interbank liquidity in municipalities mobilized to go on strikes just before strikes. These results are most consistent with my bargaining motive hypothesis that banks account fewer current earnings reported and expected future cash flows, and less liquidity revealed to employee unions just before the anticipated strikes in order to strengthen their bargaining power in wage negotiations.

Due to the covid19, the presentation will be remotely through zoom.
Linkhttps://zoom.us/j/94853633048?pwd=ZnMrbDBoS3VDMEtGTXB2ZzVVTUFBUT09

Password: 9Dp3xD

Finance Research Seminar: Patricio Valenzuela
03/04/2020 -
10:00 to 12:00
EBAPE/FGV - Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas 30 / Room 3

Finance Seminars, Patricio Valenzuela – University of Chile.
Title: Sovereign Credit Risk, Financial Fragility, and Global Factors
This study explores the relationship between sovereign credit risk, financial stability, and global factors in emerging market economies, by using a novel model-based semi-parametric metric (JLoss) that computes the expected joint loss of the banking sector in the event of a large financial meltdown. Our metric of financial fragility is positively associated with sovereign bond spread and negatively associated with higher sovereign credit ratings, after controlling for the standard determinants of sovereign credit risk. The results additionally indicate that countries with more fragile banking sectors are exposed to a global (exogenous) financial factors than those with more resilient banking sectors. These findings underscore that regulators must ensure that stability of the banking sector to improve governments’ borrowing costs in international debt markets.

Finance Research Seminar: Bernardo de Oliveira Guerra Ricca
02/05/2020 -
10:00 to 12:00
EBAPE/FGV - Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30 / Room 3

Finance Seminars, Bernardo de Oliveira Guerra Ricca, INSPER.
Title: Procurement payment periods and political contributions: evidence from Brazilian municipalities
Evidence of quid pro quo in public procurement persists despite the increasing adoption of competitive auctions. One possible explanation is that donors receive preferential treatment after the bidding stage. I test for the existence of a new channel through which politicians can exchange favors with campaign donors: earlier payment in procurement contracts. I explore an electoral reform that bans corporate contributions and partially breaks down the relationship between donors and politicians. Using a within-firm difference-in-differences identification strategy, I find that the payment period to firms that donate to the coalition government increases after the reform. The effect is larger in municipalities with low liquidity and for contracts allocated through competitive procurement methods. My results point to the importance of designing rules that curb discretion over payment periods.

Finance Research Seminar: Rafael Schiozer
01/29/2020 -
10:00 to 12:00
EBAPE/FGV - Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30/ Room 3

Finance Seminars, Rafael Schiozer, FGV EAESP.
Title: Bank loan forbearance: evidence from a million restructured loans
Forbearance is a concession granted by a lending bank to a borrower for reasons of financial difficulty. This paper examines why and when delinquent bank loans are forborne, using a novel dataset with over 13 million delinquent loans to non-financial firms in Brazil, from which 1.1 million are forborne. Our evidence shows that renegotiations of delinquent loans typically involve an extension in maturity. We also show that larger loans are more likely to be forborne, and that the greater the difficulty to seize collateral, the larger the probability of forbearance. Previous forbearances to a borrower are also positively associated with the probability of forbearance, which may be an indicative of loan evergreening. We also show that more than 80% of forbearance events occur in less than four months after a loan becomes more than 60 days past due (after which the bank may no longer accrue interest). Finally, we find that a regulatory rule that forces banks to increase provisions of non-delinquent loans when the same borrower also has a delinquent loan creates incentives for banks to forbear delinquent loans. Because loan evergreening may pose macroeconomic resource allocation problems and forbearance may be used to conceal loan losses, decrease provisions and manage earnings and capital, our findings have implications for the design of regulation and supervisory processes.

Advanced Corporate Finance
07/04/2019 - 09:00 to 07/17/2019 - 12:00
FGV/EBAPE - Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30

CBFR informrs that Professor Murillo Campello (Johnson Business School/ Cornell University) will teach the course "Advanced Corporate Finance" from July 4th - 17th at EBAPE.

 

Financial Stability Workshop
05/13/2019 - 12:00 to 05/23/2019 - 12:00
EBAPE/FGV

Dr. Wolf Wagner, a CBFR fellow, gave a Workshop at FGV-EBAPE on Financial Stability from May 13th to 23th, 2019. The workshop is part of the Finance Track of EBAPE's MSc/PhD program.